How
to forge a long-lasting, collective memory that leads to safer operations? That's
the subject of this followup post to Part 1.
Physical
markers can be valuable memory aids. Old stone monuments on
hillsides in Japan, erected following long-ago tsunami, warn those
who look for them (photo, CBS News):
Even better are functional monuments, like this building in Banda Aceh that held up against the 2004 event (photo, Daily Telegraph):
Even temporary markers like lockout tags save lives if in conjunction with physical barriers like locks that prevent a valve wheel from being turned, or a blind being unbolted.
Even better are functional monuments, like this building in Banda Aceh that held up against the 2004 event (photo, Daily Telegraph):
Even temporary markers like lockout tags save lives if in conjunction with physical barriers like locks that prevent a valve wheel from being turned, or a blind being unbolted.
The
New London explosion – the worst school catastrophe in US history –
illustrates the most costly
method to build a memory: high-profile, landmark cases that resonates strongly with the
public and lawmakers. Soon after, laws were passed requiring odorants
in natural gas for sale, and the registration of professional
engineers. Also influential were the gas leak at Bhopal, the collapse
of the Quebec Bridge in 1907, the Chernobyl reactor explosion, and
the Northeast Blackout of 1965.
But
even the most vivid memories fade, and the ranks turn over. How to
keep them fresh? On July 6, 1988, Steve Rae was an electrical
technician aboard the Piper Alpha
rig at the time a chain of mistakes led to a natural-gas leak from a
high-pressure pipe.
The chain of events promptly killed 167 men. Twenty years later he took the podium in front of 130 students at a petroleum technician's school to relive the day, its aftermath, and its costly lessons like the importance of a safety-case approach to prevention. "I attended three funerals on the same day,” he told the newly minted graduates, “and that will never leave me.”
The chain of events promptly killed 167 men. Twenty years later he took the podium in front of 130 students at a petroleum technician's school to relive the day, its aftermath, and its costly lessons like the importance of a safety-case approach to prevention. "I attended three funerals on the same day,” he told the newly minted graduates, “and that will never leave me.”
Assuming
that institutional memory is important, we have to consider this
tough question: Will it always make the critical difference? Not
alone, it won't. The loss of Challenger
seared across NASA and its contractors and made another solid-rocket
booster failure very unlikely, it didn't prevent the loss of Columbia
seventeen years later.
A
common objection to proposals that would fire up a major effort to
gather and preserve an institutional memory is that the effort will
drain thousands of hours of otherwise productive time, in additional
to consultant costs. And once it's done, who'll have the time to go
through a mass of recollections that seems less relevant by the year?
Won't the competition take advantage of our hard-won knowledge?
That's short-sighted, according to Trevor Kletz: “If we tell other
people about our accidents, then in return they may tell us about
theirs, and we shall be able to prevent them from happening to us.”
I
think two broad types of collective memory are achievable and
worthwhile in high-risk industries, each in its way. And they don't
have to be a time-burner.
The
two types are motivational
memory
and working
memory.
A
motivational memory is less about technical details and more about
remembering the need
to work cooperatively and safely.
Why do newly graduating structural engineers in Canada join in the ritual of the Iron Ring? It's not a refresher on statics and dynamics, it's a reminder that people die in collapses if experts don't sweat the details. Jack Gillum has given speeches about the catastrophic collapse of walkways at Kansas City's Hyatt Regency Hotel in 1981. Gillum, as the engineer of record, was found negligent in not catching a fatal flaw in revised shop drawings. He lost his Missouri license over it and 114 people lost their lives that night. Many more were injured in the collapse. A firefighter had to perform an amputation with a chain saw. I heard Gillum speak at an engineers' forensic convention fourteen years ago, and what he said that day remains with me. Further, I believe that when employees are injured on the job, managers who controlled the job site are obligated to visit them in the hospital, and attend funerals too.
Why do newly graduating structural engineers in Canada join in the ritual of the Iron Ring? It's not a refresher on statics and dynamics, it's a reminder that people die in collapses if experts don't sweat the details. Jack Gillum has given speeches about the catastrophic collapse of walkways at Kansas City's Hyatt Regency Hotel in 1981. Gillum, as the engineer of record, was found negligent in not catching a fatal flaw in revised shop drawings. He lost his Missouri license over it and 114 people lost their lives that night. Many more were injured in the collapse. A firefighter had to perform an amputation with a chain saw. I heard Gillum speak at an engineers' forensic convention fourteen years ago, and what he said that day remains with me. Further, I believe that when employees are injured on the job, managers who controlled the job site are obligated to visit them in the hospital, and attend funerals too.
Working
memory: rather than taking aside all employees for long recorded
interviews as they approach retirement, consider strengthening the
day to day, functional memory as held in the minds of
high-performance teams. Confronted with the need to design a new line of cars from scratch, Chrysler split the job among one hundred
“tech-clubs,” each responsible for a key component or assembly.
By forcing early companionship between design engineers, marketers
and suppliers, Chrysler found it could speed development and cut
costs. One advantage of a team approach is that expertise is broadly
distributed, lowering the risk that a single employee's departure
could cripple a critical operation. At its best, that's how the
American military works, putting hugely consequential decisions in
young hands, mentored by old hands.
Another
argument for taking a team approach is that a team is, or can be,
much more than the sum of its parts. According to psychologists who
study memory formation both individual and collective, people
remember an incident most vividly if they've participated in a group
that discussed it afterward. Safety-oriented tailgate talks at
jobsites are a good time to bring up lessons learned, fresh off the
docket.
Group
discussions about accidents and close calls also build up the
motivational memory. Through such discussions, even people who
weren't at the scene of an explosion feel the emotional impact, and
it inspires them to go the extra kilometer. As Yogi Berra might have said,
no one wants to experience disaster déjà
vu
all over again.
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